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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Tampons Exempt From Sales Tax (continued from page 87)
property, but exempted "medical
appliances" from the tax. Chicago
Municipal Code § 200.6-4 (1984).
However, the Chicago Department
of Revenue ("the Chicago department") did not define "medical
applicances" to expressly include
tampons and sanitary napkins.
The State of Illinois exempted
"medical appliances" from its ReTax
Occupation
tailers'
(Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 120, para. 441
(1985)) and Use Tax (Ill.Rev.Stat.
ch. 120, para. 439.3 (1985)). The
Illinois Department of Revenue
("the Illinois department") definition of "medical applicances" was
nearly identical to the Chicago
department's definition. In 1985,
the Illinois department began construing "medical appliances" to
include tampons and sanitary napkins, thus exempting them from
taxes. The city continued to tax
these products.
The purchasers challenged the
Chicago department's failure to
interpret "medical appliances" to
include tampons and sanitary napkins. The city and retailers argued
that tampons and sanitary napkins
were only used for hygienic purposes and should be considered
nonmedical appliances. The court
pointed out that tampons and sanitary napkins perform an absorbent
function similar to cotton and bandaids, two products that were considered "medical appliances" under the city ordinance.
Furthermore, the court noted
that when the state exempted soft
drinks from its taxes the city
amended its ordinance to exclude
soft drinks. In doing so, the Chicago City Council and the Chicago
department indicated their intent
to enforce the ordinance consistent
with Illinois tax law. The court
found the Chicago department's
refusal to exempt tampons and
sanitary napkins from the ordinance to be against the expressed
intent of the Chicago City Council
in passing the ordinance. Accordingly, the court held that tampons
and sanitary napkins were "medical appliances" and exempt from
the city tax.
Michael I. Leonard
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GEORGIA CITY
ORDINANCE
REQUIRING TOWING
SERVICES TO ACCEPT
CHECKS HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL
In Porter v. City of Atlanta,
384 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. 1989), the
Supreme Court of Georgia held
constitutional city ordinances requiring towing service operators to
post signs indicating towing fees
and to accept payment by insured
checks and credit cards.
Background
A-Tow, Inc. ("A-Tow") was a
towing company owned and operated by Val J. Porter ("Porter").
A-Tow and Porter were convicted
of violating two Atlanta ordinances by failing to accept checks and to
post towing rates. A-Tow and Porter appealed the convictions and
challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinances.
City's Authority to
Enact Ordinances
On appeal A-Tow and Porter
challenged the validity of the city
ordinances, contending that Atlanta lacked the power to regulate
businesses. To determine the ordinances' validity, the supreme court
applied a two-pronged analysis: (1)
whether the city possessed the
power to enact the ordinances and,
(2) if the power existed, whether
the exercise of power was clearly
reasonable.
The court noted that a municipality's power to regulate private
enterprise is one of its most significant, but controversial, powers.
The court emphasized, however,
that the controversy was not the
result of uncertainty concerning
the source of a city's power to
regulate trade: that power is firmly
embedded in the right of the legislature to regulate trade and to
authorize cities to do so. Rather,
the controversy stemmed from
courts' inconsistent analysis of

whether such regulations are reasonable.
Power To Enact Ordinances
In its analysis of the ordinances, the court found that three sections of the Atlanta city charter
authorized the city to regulate towing and wrecker services. First, the
city charter provided the city with
the general authority to license and
regulate "privileges, occupations,
trade and professions." Atlanta,
Ga., City Charter, app. I, § (2). In
addition to this general authority,
the charter supplied the city with
the specific authority to regulate
city businesses that "may be dangerous to persons or property"
(Atlanta Ga., City Charter, app. I, §
(18)), and to "regulate and license
vehicles operated for hire . . . and
parking" (Atlanta, Ga., City Charter, app. I, § (37)). The court
concluded that the city possessed
the power to enact towing and
wrecking service regulations.
Reasonable Exercise of Power
Having established that the
ordinances satisfied the first prong,
the court analyzed the ordinances'
reasonableness. The court noted
that the purpose behind the power
to regulate is to allow the governing
authorities to shield the public
from the excesses of private entities and their activities. The extent
of government control must not
exceed the danger of the regulated
activity because although private
interest can pose a danger of abuse,
excessive government control in
the name of protectionism can
pose an even greater danger.
Because both the government
and the private sector are potential
sources of abuse, courts must carefully view the exercise of government regulatory power over private activities. Such regulations
are not presumed to be reasonable,
but must be demonstrated to be
reasonable after the protection the
regulation affords the public is
balanced against the oppressiveness imposed on individual rights.
In determining the reasonableness of the ordinances, the
court initially examined the nature
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of the towing industry. The court
determined that Georgia law gives
towing services a great advantage
over owners of towed cars and
creates great potential for unfair
business practices and abuse of the
public. If a car owner fails to pay a
$2 parking fee the law entitles the
towing service not only to remove
the vehicle but to charge an involuntary fee and to deprive the owner of his or her automobile until the
fee is paid.
Reviewing the ordinances,
the court determined that the ordinance requiring towing services to
post fees protected the public from
potential overcharge. By requiring
towing services to accept insured
checks and major credit cards, the
second ordinance protected the
owner from unnecessary deprivation of his or her car while cash is
not immediately available.
Finding the burden on the
towing services to be insignificant,
the court determined that the protective value of the regulation outweighed the inconvenience to the
individual towing services. Therefore, the court held the ordinances
to be clearly reasonable and valid.
Ordinances Did Not Violate United
States Constitution
Article I, Section 8, Challenge.
A-Tow and Porter urged two additional constitutional grounds for
reversing the convictions. First,
they contended that the requirement that wrecker services accept
checks and credit cards violated
Article I, section 8, of the United
States Constitution because the ordinance strove to legislate a change
in legal tender. Article I, section 8,
clause 5, provides Congress with
the exclusive power to coin money
and regulate its value. The court
rejected this argument, finding
that the regulation does not require
services to accept payment in anything but legal tender. In addition,
the debt is discharged when the
towing service receives payment in
legal tender through a third party
institution.
Ordinance Withstands Due
Process Claim. A-Tow and Porter
also argued that the ordinance requiring towing services to accept
"any check which can be insured
by a check approval agency..."
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violated the United States Constitution due process clause because
the ordinance did not define the
word "insured." To determine
whether the ordinance was violative of due process, the court stated
that the proper inquiry is "whether
the statute forbids or requires an
act in terms so vague that people of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." Porter
at 634. The court held that the
term "insured" is not vague because, reasonably construed, it
means that a check approval agency will indemnify the towing service if bank account funds are
insufficient.
Sufficient Evidence That
Checks Were Tendered and
That Signs Were Not Posted
A-Tow and Porter posed two
evidentiary arguments. First, they
contended that there was no evidence that a check was properly
tendered. While the court conceded that no fully drafted check was
entered into evidence at trial, the
court observed that the witnesses
had testified that they had stopped
writing checks when A-Tow told
them that the checks would not be
accepted. The court additionally
noted that the ordinance does not
require formal tender and that
Georgia law does not necessitate
formal tender where the towing
company tells the consumer that
the check will be refused. The court
held that violation of the ordinance occurred when A-Tow indicated that a check, if written,
would be refused.
Secondly, A-Tow and Porter
asserted that there was insufficient
evidence that the required signs
were not properly posted. The
court, however, found sufficient
testimony to support the conviction for failure to post fees.
Sheila M. Hanley

SOUTH CAROLINA
HOME BUYERS MAY
RECOVER ONLY
AGAINST BUILDERS
UNDER IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY
In a recent case, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina denied
recovery to a new home purchaser
who brought suit for breach of
implied warranty of habitability
against the seller, who was also the
builder's lender. In Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & MFG. Co., 384
S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 1989), the court
held that, absent knowledge of concealed defects, the seller-lender
was not liable to the buyer on an
implied warranty of habitability
theory. However, the court also
held that the builder could be liable
to the buyer under an implied
warranty of service theory.
Factual Background
On July 21, 1977, Columbia
Lumber & Manufacturing Company ("Columbia Lumber") sold a
new home to John Kennedy
("Kennedy"). Columbia Lumber
had been the materials supplier to
the builder of the house, Charles
Crumpton ("Crumpton") of Rainbow Construction Company. Columbia Lumber had taken no part
in the actual construction of the
house. When Crumpton could not
pay Columbia Lumber for the supplies, Columbia Lumber filed a
mechanic's lien on the property.
This lien put Columbia Lumber in
a lender's position with regard to
Crumpton. Eventually, Columbia
Lumber took a deed in lieu of
foreclosure on the property and
paid off Crumpton's outstanding
mortgages. In order to recoup its
losses from Crumpton's default,
Columbia Lumber sold the house
to Kennedy, but received less than
the amount Crumpton owed for
materials.
Approximately six years after
the sale, Kennedy spotted a crack
in the brick veneer of the house.
Almost two years later, an engineer
employed by Kennedy to inspect
(continued on page 90)
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